PYQ Deep Decode · UPSC Mains 2026 · GS Paper II · Question 3

The Lok Sabha Speaker: Neutrality and the Anti-Defection Law

The question, as UPSC set itExamine whether the constitutional office of the Lok Sabha Speaker has become vulnerable to partisan politics under the current anti-defection regime. What institutional changes are required to ensure the neutrality of the Lok Sabha Speaker in managing a polarised House?
Directive: Examine / What10 marks150 wordsPolity: Parliament, Tenth Schedule
By Guranchal Ma’am, Founder, UPSC GurusPublished 19 November 2026Free to read
2roles of the Speaker: presiding officer and adjudicator
1985the Tenth Schedule
1/2 + 1/2vulnerability, then reforms
1

PYQ Deep Decode

Read the question the way the examiner set it: the demand, the hidden demand, the structure that follows from both, and how the answer should be presented, opened and closed.

1.1 The demand

Two tasks in one 10-mark question. First, examine whether the Speaker’s office has become vulnerable to partisan politics under the anti-defection regime: test the claim, with evidence for and against. Second, say what institutional changes would secure the Speaker’s neutrality in a polarised House. The answer must link the two: the problem the first part finds is what the second part fixes.

Words in the questionWhat they ask you to doWhat goes wrong if you miss them
Examine whetherTest the claim: show where the office is exposed and where safeguards hold, then reach a view.Assuming the answer is yes and listing complaints.
the constitutional office of the Lok Sabha SpeakerTreat it as an office: its powers (Articles 93-96, 100, 110(3), Tenth Schedule) and the conventions around it, not one individual.Personalising the answer.
vulnerable to partisan politics under the current anti-defection regimeFocus on the Tenth Schedule: the Speaker decides disqualification petitions while belonging to a party.Ignoring the Tenth Schedule, the heart of the question.
What institutional changes are requiredPropose structural reforms (who decides, by when, with what review), not appeals to goodwill.“The Speaker should be neutral” as a solution.
in managing a polarised HouseInclude the day-to-day role: recognition, suspensions, debate time, money bill certification.Limiting the answer to disqualification cases.
The demand in one lineTest whether the Tenth Schedule and a polarised House have exposed the Speaker to partisanship, then propose institutional changes that secure the office’s neutrality.

1.2 The hidden demand

The problem is structural, not personal: Paragraph 6 ordinarily entrusts defection adjudication to a Speaker who may retain party affiliation, creating a potential institutional conflict of interest. Paragraph 5 already permits a Speaker to relinquish party membership without disqualification, but its use is optional, not a mandatory requirement or an established convention in India. A strong answer separates the two roles of the Speaker, adjudicator in defection disputes and presiding officer of the House, which need different reforms: independent adjudication for the first; procedural fairness in recognition, debate time, motions, suspensions and money bill classification for the second. It also notes what courts have already done, and what only Parliament can do.

Each point should name the power, show where partisanship can enter, and give an Indian example. The last column is where the hidden demand begins.

PowerWhere partisanship can enterStructural fix
Disqualification under the Tenth ScheduleDelay or speed according to party advantage; Speakers have sat on petitions for long periods.Amend Paragraph 6: an independent tribunal, or the President acting on the Election Commission’s binding opinion, within a time limit.
Running the HouseSuspensions, recognition of members, admitting motions.Stronger safeguards in the existing suspension rules (373, 374, 374A), a Deputy Speaker elected on time, review of contested suspensions.
WeakThe Speaker should be impartial, and politicians should respect the office.
StrongBy leaving defection cases with a Speaker who may keep party ties, the Tenth Schedule built a potential conflict of interest into the office; neutrality needs structural change, such as independent adjudication with time limits.

1.3 The structure

The question has two explicit demands, and the hidden demand runs through both. So a useful answer has two parts, the second carrying the structural reforms. The shares are of the body between the introduction and the conclusion; they are a teaching guide, not a UPSC rule.

Introduction
1. Is the office vulnerable?about half
2. Institutional changesabout half
Conclusion
Part 1 Vulnerability under the anti-defection regime about half
Structural conflictThe Speaker, ordinarily still a party member, decides disqualification petitions (Paragraph 6, Tenth Schedule).
Delay as a toolPetitions left undecided for long periods; Keisham Meghachandra (2020) made three months from filing the ordinary outer limit, absent exceptional reasons.
Polarised HouseMass suspensions, contested recognition; a removal resolution against the Speaker (2026), the first since 1987: contested confidence, not a finding of bias.
Safeguards that holdKihoto Hollohan (1992): judicial review on limited grounds; Paragraph 5 resignation; removal under Article 94(c).
Part 2 Institutional changes for neutrality about half
Who decides defectionsAmend Paragraph 6: an independent tribunal, or the President or Governor acting on the Election Commission’s opinion (Dinesh Goswami, 1990; Law Commission 170th and 255th Reports).
Time limitsAn enforceable deadline for disqualification decisions.
ConventionsMake Paragraph 5 resignation a convention; major parties not contesting the Speaker’s seat, as in the UK.
Deputy SpeakerA definite timetable for the election under Article 93, with a convention favouring the Opposition.
Codified proceduresProportionate suspensions with recorded reasons and review; published reasons for money bill certification.

1.4 How to present it

The form follows the question. Part 1 sets exposures against safeguards, which a short pair of points shows well. Part 2 matches each problem to a reform, which a two-column table carries best inside the answer.

FormFit hereReason
Points, then a problem-reform tableEffectiveThe diagnosis leads into matched remedies.
Points throughoutEqually validFaster; the link between problem and fix must be explicit.
Flowchart of a disqualification petitionPossibleShows where delay enters, but covers only one power.

1.5 The introduction and the conclusion

The introduction serves the whole question. It names the office’s dual role, presiding officer and, under the Tenth Schedule, adjudicator, and states the tension the question probes.
The conclusion settles the demand. It gives a view: the vulnerability is structural, so neutrality must be built into institutions, not left to individual virtue.

Keep this decode with you. Download the complete decode of this question as a free, print-ready PDF. A one-time sign-up opens every free download on the site.

Download the free PDF
2

PYQ Intelligence 2013 to 2026

The question’s context in 2026, its place in a line of questions on Parliament and the anti-defection law, and what to prepare next.

2.1 Why the subject was topical in 2026

The Speaker’s neutrality was debated on the floor of the Lok Sabha in 2026, months before the examination. UPSC never states why it sets a question, so treat this as context, not cause.

WhenWhat happenedWhy it matters for this question
10 February 2026Opposition members give notice under Article 94(c) of a resolution, signed by 118 members, to remove Speaker Om Birla, alleging partisan conduct: the first such move since 1987.The office’s neutrality publicly contested.
10-11 March 2026Mohammed Jawed moves the resolution; after debate, it is rejected by voice vote on 11 March, with Jagdambika Pal of the Panel of Chairpersons presiding. The Speaker did not preside (Article 96).The safeguard exists, but numbers decide it; the vote is not a finding on bias either way.
Since 2019The office of Deputy Speaker remained vacant through the 17th Lok Sabha and into the 18th.A missing institutional check.

2.2 The skill UPSC keeps testing

These questions share one concern: whether parliamentary institutions still allow debate, dissent and fair adjudication. Questions are verbatim from the official papers unless marked.

YearThe question, as UPSC set itWhat it asked of youWhat changed in 2026
2013
GS II
The role of individual MPs (Members of Parliament) has diminished over the years and as a result healthy constructive debates on policy issues are not usually witnessed. How far can this be attributed to the anti-defection law which was legislated but with a different intention?Effect of the Tenth Schedule on MPs.From the MP to the Speaker who enforces the same law.
2014
GS II
Summary, not verbatim (12.5 marks): Article 105 and the absence of a codified law on parliamentary privileges; the question ends “How can this problem be addressed?”Parliament’s powers and their limits.Procedure and privilege as tools of the Chair.
2019
GS II
Individual Parliamentarian’s role as the national law maker is on a decline, which in turn, has adversely impacted the quality of debates and their outcome. Discuss.Decline of the individual legislator.The presiding officer’s role in that decline.
2020
GS II
‘Once a Speaker, Always a Speaker’! Do you think this practice should be adopted to impart objectivity to the office of the Speaker of Lok Sabha? What could be its implications for the robust functioning of parliamentary business in India?The neutrality convention itself.The closest precedent: now tied to the anti-defection law.
2022
GS II
Discuss the role of the Vice-President of India as the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha.The presiding officer of the other House.Now the Lok Sabha Speaker, and neutrality itself.
2023
GS II
Discuss the role of Presiding Officers of state legislatures in maintaining order and impartiality in conducting legislative work and in facilitating best democratic practices.Impartiality in running a House.The second demand of 2026: managing a polarised House.

Second tier, summaries: 2017 (joint sittings; the Public Accounts Committee), 2018 (the Estimates Committee), 2020 (the changing role of the Rajya Sabha), 2021 (parliamentary control over the executive; Department-related Standing Committees), 2023 (financial committees; British and Indian approaches to parliamentary sovereignty), 2024 (Q3, 10 marks, verbatim: “The growth of cabinet system has practically resulted in the marginalisation of the parliamentary supremacy.” Elucidate.).

Carry this method to any “is the office vulnerable” question
  1. List the powers of the office.
  2. Show where partisanship can enter each.
  3. Name the safeguards that exist.
  4. Match each gap to a structural reform.
  5. Separate person from office.

2.3 What to prepare next

Cases

Kihoto Hollohan (1992)Tenth Schedule upheld; Speaker a tribunal; review on limited grounds (mala fides, natural justice, perversity), not a merits appeal.
Nabam Rebia (2016)13 July 2016: restricted defection adjudication by a Speaker facing a removal notice. Not overruled. Subhash Desai (11 May 2023) referred it to seven judges and, pending that, allowed Speakers to decide objections to their jurisdiction, including whether the removal proceedings meet constitutional and procedural requirements.
Keisham Meghachandra (2020)21 January 2020: three months from filing is ordinarily the outer limit, absent exceptional reasons; Parliament may consider an independent permanent tribunal.
Subhash Desai (2023)11 May 2023, Maharashtra: Speaker to decide within a reasonable period; the political party, not the legislature party, appoints the Whip and leader.

Committees and reports

Dinesh Goswami Committee (1990)President or Governor to decide on the Election Commission’s opinion; whip limited mainly to confidence and no-confidence votes.
Law Commission, 170th (1999) and 255th (2015) ReportsPresident or Governor to decide on the Election Commission’s opinion; the 170th also favoured limiting whips to votes on the government’s survival.
NCRWC (2002)Vest the decision in the Election Commission itself (paragraph 4.18).
91st Amendment (2003)Deleted the one-third “split” exception (Paragraph 3), effective 1 January 2004.
3

Additional information

Everything needed to answer this question well. Tier 1 holds what the demand needs; Tier 2 places it within the wider debate on presiding officers and party discipline.

Tier 1 · Essential: the office, the law and the reforms

How a disqualification petition can stall

Step 1Petition filedA member alleges defection under the Tenth Schedule.
ExposureSpeaker decides whenNo statutory time limit; delay can keep a defector in office.
CheckJudicial reviewAfter the decision, on limited grounds (Kihoto Hollohan); three months the ordinary outer limit.
ReformIndependent bodyTribunal, or President acting on Election Commission opinion, with a deadline.
SubjectWhat it isWhy it matters for the answer
The office
Election and removalArticle 93: elected by the House; Article 94(c): removed by a resolution of the House passed by a majority of all the then members, after 14 days’ notice; Article 96: does not preside while the resolution is under consideration.The formal safeguards of the office.
PowersPresides; votes only to break a tie (Article 100(1)), but may vote in the first instance, without a casting vote, on own removal resolution (Article 96(2)); the Speaker’s Money Bill decision has constitutional finality under Article 110(3), subject to limited judicial review for serious constitutional violations (Rojer Mathew, 2019); Article 110(4) requires the Speaker’s certificate; decides Tenth Schedule petitions (Paragraph 6). If the Speaker’s own disqualification is in question, the House elects another member to decide.Each power is a point of possible partisanship.
The anti-defection regime
Tenth ScheduleAdded by the 52nd Amendment (1985). Paragraph 2: disqualification for voluntarily giving up party membership, or voting or abstaining against a party direction without permission unless condoned within 15 days; separate rules for independents and nominated members. Paragraph 4: a merger of the original party is deemed only if at least two-thirds of the legislature party agree. Paragraph 5: the Speaker may leave the party without disqualification. The 91st Amendment (2003) deleted the one-third split exception.Gives the Speaker the adjudicator’s role.
Kihoto Hollohan (1992)Upheld the Schedule; the Speaker acts as a tribunal; review available for mala fides, breach of natural justice and perversity, not a merits appeal. Paragraph 7 (bar on courts) was invalid because it lacked State ratification under Article 368(2); the rest survived.The main existing safeguard.
Keisham Meghachandra (2020)Three months from filing ordinarily the outer limit, absent exceptional reasons; Parliament may consider an independent permanent tribunal.The court’s own pointer to reform.
Reform options
Independent adjudicationAmend Paragraph 6 so that the President or Governor decides on the Election Commission’s opinion (Dinesh Goswami, 1990; Law Commission 170th, 1999, and 255th, 2015); or the Election Commission itself (NCRWC, 2002); or a tribunal headed by a retired judge.Removes the conflict of interest.
Neutrality conventionsIndia already allows it: Paragraph 5 lets a Speaker resign from the party (and rejoin after leaving office) without disqualification. In the UK, the Speaker puts aside party ties and stands as “the Speaker seeking re-election”; major parties generally do not contest the seat, though smaller parties may. The reform is to make nonpartisanship a convention.Builds neutrality into the office’s tradition.
Deputy SpeakerArticle 93 requires the House to choose a Deputy Speaker “as soon as may be”, with no numerical deadline; the post often went to the Opposition by convention, not by constitutional command.Shares the chair and signals balance.
Office, not person. The question does not ask whether a particular Speaker is partisan. It asks whether the design of the office exposes any holder to partisan pressure. Answers that attack individuals lose marks and miss the point.
Two roles, two remedies. As adjudicator, the Speaker needs to be replaced by an independent body for defection cases. As presiding officer, the Speaker needs support: the existing suspension rules (373, 374, 374A) applied with recorded reasons and proportionality, a Deputy Speaker, and conventions of restraint.
Tier 2 · Extended understanding: the whole topic around it

Signs of vulnerability

  1. Delayed petitions: defectors keep seats for long periods.
  2. Mass suspensions: opposition members removed in large numbers.
  3. Money bill certification: disputed use to bypass the Rajya Sabha.
  4. Vacant Deputy Speaker: no shared chair.

Safeguards that remain

  1. Judicial review: ordinarily after the final decision, on constitutional or jurisdictional grounds; courts may also act against extraordinary delay.
  2. Removal resolution: Article 94(c).
  3. Rules of Procedure: the House’s own code, including suspension rules.
  4. Paragraph 5: a Speaker may leave the party.
  5. Tradition: many Speakers have acted with neutrality.

Two debates worth knowing

Should the Speaker lose the defection power?

One view: only an outside body can be neutral. The other: Parliament’s internal matters should stay within Parliament. The balanced reading: an independent tribunal with a deadline and judicial review keeps the House’s dignity and removes the conflict.

Is the anti-defection law itself the problem?

It curbed “Aaya Ram, Gaya Ram” defections but also silenced individual MPs. Some propose limiting it to confidence and money votes. The balanced reading: narrowing the whip to votes on the government’s survival would shrink the range of disqualifying votes, and so the room for contested adjudication; it would not necessarily reduce defections.

4

Pitfalls and variations

The mistakes that cost marks here, the claims never to make, and how the answer changes when the question changes.

4.1 Six pitfalls, each with its correction

Personal attackThe present Speaker is biased towards the ruling party.The Tenth Schedule leaves defection cases with any Speaker, who ordinarily keeps party ties.
Moral appeal as reformThe Speaker should be neutral.An independent tribunal with a deadline should decide defections.
Ignoring the Tenth ScheduleThe Speaker’s role in debates has become partisan.The core exposure lies in disqualification decisions under Paragraph 6.
Wrong case lawCourts cannot review the Speaker’s decisions.Kihoto Hollohan (1992) allowed judicial review on limited grounds.
One-sidedThe office has lost all neutrality.Safeguards exist: judicial review, Article 94(c), Paragraph 5, tradition.
Forgetting the polarised HouseOnly disqualification matters.Suspensions, recognition and money bill certification also test neutrality.

4.2 Never write these

  • “The Speaker is removed by a two-thirds majority.” Article 94(c): a majority of all the then members.
  • “The Tenth Schedule was added by the 61st Amendment.” It was the 52nd Amendment (1985).
  • “The 91st Amendment allowed splits of one-third.” It deleted the split exception.
  • “Kihoto Hollohan struck down the Tenth Schedule.” It upheld it, striking down only Paragraph 7.
  • “The Speaker cannot vote.” The Speaker has a casting vote, and votes in the first instance on a removal resolution.
  • “A Speaker cannot leave the party without disqualification.” Paragraph 5 allows it.
  • “Nabam Rebia has been overruled.” It was referred to a larger Bench in 2023, not overruled.
  • “Courts have fixed a binding three-month deadline.” Three months is the ordinary outer limit, with exceptions.

4.3 If the question changes

If it asksThe structure becomesWhat must change
Critically evaluate the anti-defection lawPurpose; achievements; problems; reformsThe law, not only the Speaker.
Role of the Deputy SpeakerConstitutional position; functions; vacancy; conventionsArticle 93 and conventions at the centre.
Compare the Indian and UK SpeakerElection, party ties, re-election, powersA comparison table.
The same question for 15 marksThe same two parts, with cases and committee reportsRoom for the debates.
5

The model answer

One model answer, written to the 150-word limit, in the form this question calls for: points on vulnerability, then a problem-and-reform table. The introduction covers the whole question; the conclusion settles its demand.

Model answer Points and a reform table 153 words

The Speaker’s dual role, presiding over the Lok Sabha and adjudicating defections, creates partisan risks requiring institutional safeguards for impartial House management.

1. Is the office vulnerable?

  • Conflict of interest: a Speaker retaining party membership decides petitions involving that party.
  • Delay: petitions have stayed pending; Keisham Meghachandra (2020) made three months the ordinary limit.
  • Polarisation: mass suspensions and the 2026 removal resolution, the first since 1987, show contested confidence in the Chair.
  • Safeguards: limited judicial review (Kihoto Hollohan, 1992) and removal under Article 94(c) remain.

2. Institutional changes

ProblemReform
Partisan adjudicationIndependent tribunal, or President on EC opinion
DelayStatutory deadline
Party tiesNormalise party resignation; major-party non-contestation
Single chairTime-bound Deputy Speaker election; Opposition convention
Mass suspensionsProportionate suspensions with recorded reasons and review
Money bill certificationPublished certification reasons

The office remains constitutionally protected but structurally exposed to partisan pressures; independent adjudication and fair parliamentary procedures are therefore essential to its neutrality.

DemandVulnerability tested with exposures and safeguards, then matched reforms
Hidden demandOffice, not person: the structural conflict of interest
StructureAbout half and half
BalanceIntroduction 22 words, conclusion 23 words; 153 words in all
Why it works: the introduction names the dual role and signals the need for safeguards; Part 1 tests the claim with exposures and safeguards; the table matches each problem to a structural reform; the conclusion weighs protection against exposure and gives the view.
6

Other ways to write it

The model answer above remains the answer. These outlines show how a different, equally valid answer could be built, and when each choice works.

ApproachHow it is builtWhen it works
Power-by-powerDisqualification, suspensions, money bills, recognition: exposure and fix for each.When you want every power covered.
Open with the UK contrastIntroduction: a Speaker who leaves party politics; then India’s structure.When the comparison is your strongest angle.
Courts and ParliamentWhat courts have done (review, deadlines); what only Parliament can do (tribunal).When case law is your strength.
For 15 marksAdd committee reports and narrowing the whip.When there is room.
7

Quick recall and Prelims crossover

Facts for rapid revision and Prelims.

1Article 93: Speaker and Deputy Speaker.9Kihoto Hollohan: 1992; Paragraph 7 struck down.
2Article 94(c): removal by a majority of all the then members; 14 days’ notice.10Nabam Rebia: 2016; referred to a larger Bench in 2023, not overruled.
3Article 96: Speaker does not preside during own removal resolution.11Keisham Meghachandra: 2020; three months the ordinary outer limit.
4Article 100(1): votes only on a tie; 96(2): votes first, no casting vote, on own removal.12Dinesh Goswami Committee: 1990.
5Article 110(3): Speaker’s Money Bill decision final; 110(4): certificate.13Law Commission: 170th (1999), 255th (2015).
6Tenth Schedule: 52nd Amendment, 1985.14Removal resolution: notice 10 February 2026; rejected by voice vote 11 March 2026.
7Paragraph 5: Speaker may leave party; Paragraph 6: Speaker decides disqualification.15Earlier removal attempts: 1954, 1966, 1987.
891st Amendment, 2003: split exception deleted.16Merger (Paragraph 4): two-thirds of the legislature party must agree.
The one sentence to carry out of this documentA Speaker is most securely neutral when the office no longer asks a party member to judge his own party.
8

Write it yourself

Write the answer in 150 words without looking back, then check it against each line below.

CheckYes / No
1Does the introduction name the Speaker’s dual role?
2Is the Tenth Schedule at the centre of Part 1?
3Are safeguards also named, not only problems?
4Is each reform structural and matched to a problem?
5Is the answer about the office, not a person?
6Does the conclusion give a view, at about the length of the introduction?
7Is it 150 words or a little over, with no claim from section 4.2?
Free · One per aspirant

Write your first answer. Get written feedback, free.

Reading a decode helps you understand the question. Writing your own answer helps you put that understanding into practice. Write this answer and send it to us: your first answer receives a free written evaluation by the UPSC Gurus method.

  1. Write the answer by hand on A4 sheets, within about 150 words, before you look at the model answer.
  2. Go through the self-check in section 8 above, then photograph every page clearly (or scan it as one PDF).
  3. Upload it below. Your written feedback comes to your email: how your answer met the question’s demand and implied dimensions, its structure, content and presentation, and what to work on next.
One free evaluation per aspirant, on any PYQ Deep Decode question. Continue with four questions every weekday in GS Daily Answer Writing, or full papers in the Mains Test Series, with evaluation and mentoring. Explore Mains Mastery, or book your free first Mentor’s Desk call.

Explore personalised support

Full Paper Evaluation
Rs 1,499 per paper, including GST

Write any actual UPSC Mains GS paper from 2017 to 2026. Receive written evaluation of every answer by email, followed by a personal feedback session.

Get my paper evaluated
Preparation Counselling
Rs 799, including GST

Understand where your preparation stands through a structured diagnosis, a written roadmap and one follow-up session. The full counselling fee is adjusted against any UPSC Gurus programme you join within 30 days. This is a fee adjustment, not a refund.

Book counselling

Sources

  • Constitution of India: Articles 93, 94, 96, 100, 110(3) and (4); Tenth Schedule, Paragraphs 2 to 7; Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act, 1985; Constitution (Ninety-first Amendment) Act, 2003.
  • Supreme Court: Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992); Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (2016); Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur (2020); Subhash Desai v. Principal Secretary, Governor of Maharashtra (2023).
  • Committee on Electoral Reforms (Dinesh Goswami, 1990); Law Commission of India, 170th Report (1999) and 255th Report (2015); NCRWC (2002); Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha, Rules 373, 374, 374A; UK Parliament on the Speaker.
  • Lok Sabha proceedings and reports of the removal resolution against the Speaker (notice 10 February 2026; debate 10-11 March; rejected 11 March 2026).
  • UPSC Civil Services (Main): GS Paper II 2013, 2014, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023 and 2026. Official question papers.
Guranchal Ma’am, Founder, UPSC Gurus. First published on upscgurus.in on 19 November 2026 as part of the UPSC Gurus PYQ Deep Decode. You are welcome to share the link to this page. If you reproduce any part of the decode, please credit UPSC Gurus.
Mentor’s Desk · free, one per aspirant

Your first Mentor’s Desk call is free

One free conversation per aspirant about where you are in your preparation, with an honest suggestion of the right next step.

Know more and book
Questions · any time

Have a question? Get in touch

For questions about a programme, its fees, batch dates, payment or access. Message us on WhatsApp and our team will reply. Asking a question is not a booking, and you can ask as often as you need.

Get in touch on WhatsApp